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I In the Matter of 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
Respondent, 
- and -
EDWIN ROBISCH, 
Charging Party, 
STATE•OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-4/7/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE No. U-2269 
The gravamen of the charge herein, which was filed by Edwin 
Robisch on August 27, 1976, is that the Wappingers Central School Board of 
Education (respondent) committed an improper practice in violation of 
Section 209.a-l(a) and (c) by denying Robisch's request for an extension 
of a leave of absence in that the request was denied because of Robisch's 
activities in behalf of an employee organization. The hearing officer 
dismissed the charge, concluding that the respondent 
". ...rather than being motivated by animus, rejected the 
leave request because of its past practice in such 
matters, its concern about setting a new precedent 
and for other reasons, all normally and legitimately 
associated with performance of its mission." 
Robisch filed exceptions to the decision of the hearing officer. 
The substance of the exceptions filed was that a) the denial of the leave 
was inherently destructive of Robisch's rights under Section 202 of the Act; 
b) in the alternative, if the denial were not inherently destructive of 
Robisch's rights as an employee, there was an unmet burden on the respondent 
to establish that its discriminatory conduct was motivated by business 
justifications; c) moreover, the record supports a finding of animus on the 
part of the respondent. Before considering these contentions of Robisch, 
we set forth, the facts underlying the issues. \ ^Jtv)Q0 
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The charging party, Robisch, is a guidance counsellor who has 
been employed by respondent since 1964. In March, 1976, he became a state-
wide co-chairperson of the New York Educators Association (NYEA) which was 
organized for the purpose of achieving collective bargaining for employees in 
the teaching profession throughout the State. This was a newly formed organi-
zation, coming into being in March, 1976. Respondent's employees were at 
that time represented for collective bargaining by another organization. In 
March, 1976, Robisch applied for a leave of absence from his employment to 
serve as state-wide co-chairperson. The request was for a leave until August, 
1976, and it was granted by respondent. In July, 1976, Robisch requested an 
extension of the leave for the school year 1976-77. This request was denied on 
July 26, 1976 by a 7 to 1 vote of respondent Board of Education. The minutes 
of that meeting note that one member, Zucker, stated that he voted against 
the leave of absence because he did not want the District to support a second 
career for Robisch. According to Robisch, the President of the Board of 
Education, Ross, stated to him: 
"...that as best he could determine, it was the Board's 
feeling that they didn't want to promote a second career 
...another career, arid that they did not want to gee 
involved with inter-union warfare...by prejudicing one 
side against the other." 
Also, according to Robisch, member Zucker in discussing with him the denial of 
the request for an extension of the leave said to Robisch: 
"...there's no way that I'm going to promote the 
destruction of public education in this State by having 
union leaders like you moving about the State." 
Two other members of the Board of Education testified at the hearing. They 
are Gribble and Carney, both of whom participated in the July 20 meeting 
and voted for the denial of extension of the leave. According to Gribble, 
the discussion of the board members regarding the request for an extension 
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indicated concerns on their part that, as this was an extension of a leave 
previously granted, it would establish an undesirable precedent of successive 
leaves. Further, at the time of the vote denying the request, the school 
district was experiencing a budget crisis and some people in the community 
were questioning the need for the retention of the guidance program. As 
Robisch was recognized as an outstanding guidance counselor, it was thought 
by board members that extension of the leave might indicate that the board 
shared this opinion of the guidance program. Carney testified that Robisch's 
activities in NYEA had no bearing on the decision of the board; the only 
question was whether it would be contrary to board policy and practice. This, 
he testified, was the consensus of the board. 
With respect to the respondent's policy as to leaves, the 
majority of leaves granted were for maternity. Instances of leaves other 
than for maternity were a three-month leave to serve a professional internship 
and a 10-month leave for a teacher to accompany her husband on a job assign-
ment. Leaves were denied to two employees who sought them to go into an 
unrelated type of work. The board did grant leave to Phillips to work as a 
staff person with NYEA. 
We now consider the exceptions seriatim. 
a) Robisch argues that the denial of the leave was inherently 
destructive of his rights under Section 202 of the Act. 
In support of this exception, Robisch would have this Board adopt 
the principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in construing the 
National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Great Dane, 388 U.S. 26 (1967). 
There, the Court held that if the nature of the employer's discriminatory 
conduct were inherently destructive of important employee rights, no proof 
of anti-union motivation would be needed to support a finding of unfair labor 
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practice even if the employer introduced evidence to show that his conduct 
was motivated by legitimate and substantial business concerns.—' We do not 
have to reach the question whether this Board should or should not adopt the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Great Dane, for the application of the 
Great Dane doctrine would require, first, a finding that the conduct of the 
respondent complained of was discriminatory and, secondly, that it was 
inherently destructive of important employee rights. We are not persuaded on 
the evidence in the record herein that the respondent's conduct was discrim-
inatory within the meaning of CSL §209-a.l(c). 
The denial of the request for an extension of a leave previously 
granted does not represent a departure from respondent's policy or practice. 
Respondent did not deny the original requests of Robisch and Phillips for 
leave to work with NYEA. In fact, the request for an extension if granted 
would be a departure from policy and practice. The fact that respondent has 
on occasion granted successive maternity leaves does not permit or warrant 
a conclusion that the denial here was discriminatory. Maternity leaves are 
obviously different, involving employer-employee considerations not relevant 
here. The thrust of charging party's contention here is that a denial of an 
employee's request for a leave to serve with an "employee organization" is a 
per se violation. This Board is not aware of any authority either in the 
private or public sector which would support this contention. 
Secondly, even if the denial of the request for an extension were 
found to be discriminatory, there is no evidence in the record to support a 
finding that such denial was "inherently destructive of important employee 
rights" as defined by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. , 373 
1/ Decisions of the Supreme Court construing the National Labor Relations Act 
are not binding or controlling precedent for this Board under the law 
(CSL §209-a.3), although we do adopt their reasoning where appropriate. 
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(') U.S. 221 (1963). In Erie Resistor the Supreme Court found that the grant of 
superseniority to the replacements of striking employees effectively 
destroyed the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining. Thus, the grant by the employer of super-
seniority stifled the exercise of obviously fundamental employee rights. In 
the instant case, charging party has failed to establish that denial of 
extension of leave to a single employee to serve an employee organization 
in its state-wide organizing efforts, particularly one not the representative 
of employees in the negotiating unit, was "inherently destructive of 
important employee rights,"" 
b) Robisch argues, in the alternative, if the respondent's conduct 
were not inherently destructive of his rights as an employee, there was an 
unmet burden on the respondent to establish that its discriminatory conduct 
was motivated by business justifications. 
Assuming even that the conduct here was deemed for some reason to be 
discriminatory, the effect of such discriminatory conduct would be compara-
tively slight; in such circumstances, as the Supreme Court pointed out in 
Great Dane, supra, anti-union motivation would have to be proven to sustain 
the. char.ge~.if..'the- employer has produced evidence of a legitimate and substan-
tial business justification for its conduct. As found by the hearing officer 
and supported by the record, respondent acted because of its concern about 
setting a new precedent and for other reasons normally and legitimately 
associated with the performance of its mission. 
c) Robisch contends that the record supports a finding of animus 
on the part of the respondent. 
On this record, we find no animus on the part of respondent. The 
^ respondent did grant Robisch a leave to serve with NYEA. It also granted 
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leave to another employee to serve with NYEA. The statements of board member 
Zucker appear, from the record, to be solely his own opinions. No evidence 
is shown that those opinions were shared by other board members. 
We overrule the exceptions filed by the charging party and 
adopt the findings and conclusions of law of the hearing officer. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that the charge herein be dismissed in 
its entirety. 
Dated: New York, New York 
April 7, 1977 
/JOSEPH R. CROWLEY-
IDA KLAUS 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-4/7/77 
In 
THE 
THE 
the Matter of 
MONROE 
MONROE 
DISTRICT, 
WOODBURY 
WOODBURY 
TEACHERS 
and-
CENTRAL 
Ch 
ASSOCIATION, ; 
Respondent, * 
SCHOOL : 
arging Party. : 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2393 
On November 8, 1976, the Monroe Woodbury Central School District 
(employer) filed a charge alleging that the Monroe Woodbury Teachers Associatioi. 
(Association) violated CSL Section 209-a.2(b) by refusing to negotiate in good 
faith in that it improperly insisted that a demand constituting a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation be submitted to factfinding. The demand at issue is: 
"This Agreement shall be binding upon the Board and 
any school district into which this district may be 
merged or consolidated, unless otherwise agreed to by 
the Association. As a condition of any merger or con-
solidation, all teachers presently employed by the 
district shall retain their position in any merged or 
consolidated district if they so desire.M 
In its answer, the Association admits that it insisted that the demand 
in question be submitted to factfinding, but it alleges that the demand is. 
a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
On December 13, 1976, a stipulation of facts was submitted by the parties, 
who requested that the matter be processed under §204.4 of our Rules. Under 
that procedure, there is no intermediate determination by a hearing officer; 
rather, the record and briefs are submitted directly to this Board. The 
request was granted and briefs were received from both parties on February 4, 
1977. mi 
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There are two distinct aspects of the demand, both of which would apply-
in the event that the employer were merged or consolidated into another district 
One part of the demand would guarantee that no unit employees would be laid off 
in the event of any such merger or consolidation; the other would extend the 
proposed agreement to the surviving school district in the event of such a mer-
ger or consolidation. Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
briefs, we determine that both parts are nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
On several occasions, this Board has held that a public employer need not 
negotiate over its decision to lay off employees (Matter of New Rochelle, 
4 PERB 1(3060 [1971]; Matter of City of White Plains, 5 PERB 1(3008 [1972]). The 
Court of Appeals has agreed with our conclusion that job security is a per-
missive, but not a mandatory, subject of negotiation (Yonkers City School 
District v. Teachers, 40 NY 2d 268 [1976]). As the Association could not re-
quire the employer to negotiate with it over its guarantee of job security, a_ 
fortiori, it cannot require the employer to negotiate with it over a guarantee 
of job security by a successor employer. 
The other part of the demand focuses directly upon the application of a 
contract to a possible successor employer. Article 31 of the Education Law 
deals with the consolidation of school districts. Section 15 of that Article 
makes it clear that if the employer were consolidated into another district, it 
would be dissolved. The successor employer would be a separate entity and 
would not have been represented during present negotiations. The Association 
cannot compel the employer to negotiate over a demand that would bind an 
1 
entity that is not a party to these negotiations. 
1 Accord NLRB v. Burns International Security Services Int'l, 406 US 272 (1972) 
"...although successor employers may be bound to recognize and bargain 
with the union, they are not bound by the substantive provisions of a 
collective bargaining contract negotiated by their predecessors but 
not agreed to or assumed by them." MT^f^tZ 
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In Matter of Board of Higher Education of the Ci,ty of 'Ney JQX"^, 7. 
PERB 3028 (1974) and Matter of Yorktoyh Faculty'Association, 7 PERB 3030 
(1974) this Board determined that it is a violation of its duty to negotiate 
in good faith for one party, over the objections of the other, to carry a 
demand for a nonmandatory subject of negotiation into and beyond factfinding. 
In her • dissenting opinion, Member Ida Klaus concludes that it is not 
a violation of the Association's duty to negotiate in good faith for it 
to have carried its demand for a nonmandatory subject of negotiation into 
factfinding over the objection of the employer. She reasons that the 
Association's conduct did not interfere with negotiations. 
The nature of improper insistence was considered by us in the 
Board of Higher Education case, supra. In that case, the respondent had 
argued inter alia that "it never conditioned its participation in further 
negotiations upon BHE's acceptance of the demand that its insistence 
upon it did not delay or interfere with the progess of negotiations." 
We considered this argument in the context of the point that "a party may 
propose for agreement matters that are not mandatory subjects of negotiations, 
but it may not press such a proposal to the point of insistence." Our 
conclusion was that: "It is, of course, difficult to draw a precise line 
between appropriate conduct in proposing nonmandatory contract terms and 
inappropriate insistence upon such a demand. We determine that the insistence 
on the demand in the instant case went too far when, over the objections of 
BHE, it was carried into fact-finding and even beyond fact-finding," 
We reaffirm our commitment to that test. Applying it to the facts in the 
instant case, we determine that the Association improperly insisted upon 
the negotiation of a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
TOO 
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We join with our dissenting member in supporting the concept 
that, save for prohibited subjects, all areas of concern of employees should 
be aired in the collective bargaining process. This is predicated on the 
belief that a concern phrased in the form of a collective bargaining demand 
is an excellent channel of communication between an employer and its employees 
for it would seem important for an employer - either in the private or 
public sector - to know the concerns of employees. Whether or not it be a 
matter as to which the employer may deem it appropriate to take remedial action 
at least the concern is aired and this is desirable. 
We differ from our dissenting member, however, that a party to 
the negotiations may continue to insist upon negotiating with respect to a 
nonmandatbry • subject in the last step of the negotiating process, namely, 
factfinding. In such circumstances, the parties have been at impasse and sub-
mit the open issues to a neutral for his non-binding determination. At this 
stage of the impasse procedures, the objective of the parties and the neutral 
is an agreement. Therefore there must be removed from the negotiating process 
at that point subjects which are obviously of peripheral concern, namely, 
2 
permissive subjects. Therefore we are persuaded that for a party to insist 
upon submission of permissive subjects to the factfinding process is an act 
that tends to frustrate the goal of the factfinder and the parties, to wit, an 
agreement. It is a diversion and accords to such , nonmandatory subjects a 
status that the Law denies. The concern of the factfinder should be directed 
solely to issues involving mandatory subjects. This alone in most instances 
is a substantial burden and it should not be intensified by the inclusion of 
2_ Admittedly, such subjects may be, to a party, more than a peripheral concerii 
but they are not mandatory subjects of negotiation. In factfinding, which 
results in public recommendations, the focus of the parties and factfinder 
should be on mandatory subjects, and to that extent permissive subjects 
are peripheral. r*nw 4ob7 
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of • nonmandatory items. 
Our dissenting member relies upon NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 
356 U.S. 342 (1958) to support her position. We read Borg-Warner and 
decisions subsequent thereto to establish a principle that it is unlawful 
for a party in collective bargaining to insist upon bargaining with respect 
to a permissive subject beyond the point of impasse. The dissent argues 
that such impropriety arises only if there is articulated a concomitant 
statement to the effect that such nonmandatory demands must be included 
in the agreement and that absent such statement or shibboleth there is no . 
unlawful conduct. We reject this argument as one elevating form over 
substance, for according to the dissent, unless the magic words are uttered 
a violation does not exist. We find such an approach unrealistic. The 
realities are that the inclusion of such nonmandatory subjects in the 
factfinding process is, for the reasons above stated, disruptive of the attain-
ment of the goal of the impasse procedures and should not therefore be 
condoned. 
Finally, we also disagree that the administrative policy of this 
Board has eliminated mediation. This Board does not direct parties to 
factfinding until the mediatory process has been exhausted. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we determine that The Monroe Woodbury Teachers 
Association has failed to negotiate in good 
faith by insisting upon the negotiation of a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation, and 
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DISSENTING OPINION OF BOARD MEMBER IDA KLAUS 
The Board has found that it is per se an unlawful refusal 
to bargain in good faith for a party to insist upon submitting to factfinding 
a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. Thus, a bare stipulation that such 
conduct occurred, as was the case here, is, without more, sufficient basis 
for a finding of improper practice. I cannot agree. 
The doctrine properly applicable here is that enunciated in 
NLRB v. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958), in which the United States Supreme 
Court held it to be unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act for a 
party to refuse to enter into any collective bargaining agreement unless the 
agreement includes a clause covering a non-mandatory subject proposed by that 
party. The Court's reasoning was that the refusal to enter into any agreement 
without the nonmandatory provision is "in substance, a refusal to bargain 
about the subjects that are within the scope of mandatory negotiations". 
In other words, the Court emphasized that insistence on inclusion of the 
clause "as a condition to any agreement" obstructs the fulfillment of the 
fundamental purpose of the collective bargaining process, which is to reach 
agreement as to terms and conditions of employment governing the employer-
employee relationship. 
In Board of Higher Education, 7 PERB 3042, this Board cited 
with approval the Borg-Warner doctrine, which it apparently interpreted to 
mean, however, that a party may not press a proposal as to a nonmandatory 
subject "to the point of insistence." Apart from implying a degree of 
firmness in presenting and urging the proposal, the "point of insistence" 
test would appear to turn on the length of time in the course of the 
negotiations and subsequent procedures the demand is kept alive. Under Borg-
Warner, the insistence is substantive, lying in the imposition of the 
precondition to the making of any agreement. The Board did not explicate 
4669 
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the theory of its holding. It did nevertheless apply its test in the 
Board of Higher Education case to the facts as fully developed there in a 
record made at a Board hearing, and it found, on those facts, that "insistence 
on the demand...went too far when, over the objections of the Board of 
Higher Education [the employer], it was carried into factfinding and even 
beyond." 
The Board has now, in this case, moved further away from the 
basic Borg-Warner reasoning, dispensing even with evidentiary support save 
only the bare facts of a stipulation that the clause was brought to factfindinj 
It is well recognized that factfinding is a continuation of the 
bargaining process. A form of conciliation, its objective is to enable the 
parties to reach their own agreement through the give-and-take of that 
process as guided by a third party. The mechanistic procedural basis for 
decision-making adopted in this case would limit the allowable scope of 
that process.. It would cut off the course of bargaining all the more now 
that the Board has virtually eliminated mediation as a first recourse and 
is directing disputes immediately into factfinding. 
In my view, the parties have utilized the processes of the Board 
to obtain a declaratory judgment, and the Board, in effect, has complied. 
This is contrary to its earlier holdings in Northport, 9 PERB 3089, and 
Ellenville, 9 PERB 3090. 
The sparse facts presented to us do not permit the conclusion 
that the Association, in proposing the clause in question and in pursuing it 
to factfinding, took the firm position that it would not enter into any 
agreement unless it contained the clause. There is consequently no basis 
for condemning the Association's conduct as unlawful. 
4670 
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The charge should be dismissed. In the alternative, the 
record should be reopened and the case sent to hearing for a full and complete 
evidentiary record. 
DATED: New York, New York 
April 7, 1977 
r-^£rt, I(ZAsU^o<^^' 
IDA KLAUS 
bVl 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2C-4/7/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2141 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Dutchess County 
Deputy Sheriff's Unit, Dutchess County Chapter, Civil Service-. Employees 
Association, Inc. (charging party) from a hearing officer's decision dis-
missing its charge against Lawrence M. Quinlan, Sheriff, Dutchess County 
(respondent). The charge had alleged that the respondent had violated CSL 
1 
§§209-^.1 (a), (b) and (c) in that he interfered with mail and telephone 
communications of the charging party and with a fundraising activity engaged 
in by it. The hearing officer dismissed the charge insofar as it alleged a 
violation of CSL §209-a.l(b) on the ground that the conduct complained of, 
even if proven, did not establish that respondent had attempted "to dominate 
or interfere with the formation or administration of [charging party]...." 
— These sections of the Act provide that "It shall be an improper practice 
for a public employer or its agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, 
restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights 
guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose of depriving them 
of such rights; (b) to dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any employee organization for the purpose of depriving 
them of such rights; (c) to discriminate against any employee for the 
purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in, or participation 
in the activities of, any employee organization;..." 
4672 
In the Matter of 
LAWRENCE M. QUINLAN, SHERIFF, DUTCHESS COUNTY, 
Respondent, 
-and-
DUTCHESS COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S UNIT, DUTCHESS 
COUNTY CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
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He dismissed the charge insofar as it alleged a violation of CSL §§209-a.l(a) 
and (c) on the basis of his finding that the evidence did not establish that 
respondent acted on the basis of animus directed at the charging party. There 
is no question but that respondent told his employees that they could not 
participate in charging party's fundraising program, presumably while on duty 
or in uniform. Those employees did participate in the fundraising drive while 
off duty and without being punished. The record does not establish that 
respondent interfered with charging party's mail and telephone messages. 
Charging party's exceptions argue: 
1. That the evidence is sufficient to compel a conclusion that respondent's 
conduct was motivated by animus against it. 
2. That the denial by respondent of certain space to charging party was a 
violation of an agreement between them. 
3. That record evidence establishes that respondent's conduct had a 
"chilling" effect on charging party's fundraising campaign. 
Having reviewed the record, we determine that the hearing officer's 
finding that respondent was not motivated by animus is consistent with the 
evidence in the record. We also find that the record supports his conclusion 
that respondent's conduct did not have a "chilling" effect on the charging 
party's fundraising campaign. Finally, we agree with the reasoning of the 
hearing officer that the issue of whether respondent's conduct violated an 
existing agreement between the parties was not before him. Ordinarily 
contract rights must be enforced through the grievance procedure contained 
in the contract or by court action. A unilateral change in an agreement may 
constitute a violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith. However, no 
such violation was alleged in this case. 
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Board - U-2141 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth here and in the hearing 
officer's decision, 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed 
in its entirety. 
Dated: New York, New York 
April 7, 1977 
Robert D. Helsby/ Chairman 
fan. LQ& 
Jposepjf R. Crowley 
/S^JUUjsiQ.^ 
Ida Klaus 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#20-4/7/77 
In the Matter of 
TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL AUTHORITY, 
Respondent, 
- and -
TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL AUTHORITY 
SERGEANTS AND LIEUTENANTS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE No. U-2149 
The charge herein was filed by the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
Authority Sergeants and Lieutenants Benevolent Association, Inc. (charging 
party) on June 9, 1976. It alleges that the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
Authority (respondent) refused to negotiate in good faith in violation of 
CSL §209-a.l(d) in that it refused to negotiate over charging party's demands 
for a contract to be effective on July 1, 1976. The last agreement between 
the charging party and respondent covered the period from July 1, 1972 to 
June 30, 1975. Negotiations for a successor agreement commended on April 4, 
1975, but they were unproductive. Notwithstanding the assistance of mediation 
and factfinding, the parties failed to reach an agreement and, on April 23, 
1975, respondent's legislative body, acting in accordance with CSL §209.3(e), 
prescribed the terms and conditions of employment of the persons in the nego-
tiating unit represented by charging party. This legislative determination 
was retroactive to the end of the prior agreement but was silent as to the 
time when it would expire. 
On May 26, 1976, the charging party served demands for a new con-
tract which was to take effect retroactively to January 1, 1976. Respondent's 
fiscal year is the calendar year. Respondent refused to negotiate with respec. 
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to those demands, contending that the legislative resolution of the dispute 
would continue through December 31, 1976. This refusal occasioned the charge 
herein. 
In his decision, the hearing officer determined that the legislative 
resolution of the dispute did not expire on either December 31, 1975 or December 
31, 1976. Rather, he concluded that it expired on June 30, 1976. Both the 
charging party and the respondent have filed exceptions to this determination. 
Having considered the record and the arguments of the parties, we confirm the 
hearing officer's conclusions of law. In Matter of City of Mount Vernon, 5 
PERB 1(3057, we rejected the proposition that a legislative determination could 
apply for two years unless both parties had agreed in advance to be bound by it 
for such a period of time. In that decision we said: 
"The core of the Taylor Law is the policy that governments 
should negotiate with and enter into written agreements 
with employee organizations representing public employees 
which have been certified or recognized [CSL §200]. 
Coercive action by an employee organization to impose 
its will is inappropriate. So is coercive action by a 
public employer. Nevertheless, there are occasions when 
contesting parties cannot reach an agreement and yet the 
business of government must proceed. The exigencies of 
government are particularly related to its budgetmaking 
process and, if the parties fail to reach an agreement, 
the budget of the employer must be confronted without an 
agreement having been made. To cover this eventuality, 
the law provides that the legislative body of the govern-
ment involved 'shall take such action as it deems to be in 
the public interest, including the interest of the public 
employees involved' [CSL §209.3(e)]. This legislative 
responsibility is to be used in emergencies only and is 
designed to provide a temporary modus operandi. Once the 
emergency is past, the parties are once again expected to 
fulfill their statutory obligation, which is to negotiate 
and enter into written agreements. 
"....The waiver by an employee organization of its statutorily 
protected right to negotiate an agreement must be an explicit 
one. Participation in a mandated proceeding before the local 
legislature and presentation to that local legislature of a 
prior negotiations posture does not constitute submission to 
arbitration or a waiver of its right to subsequent negotiations, 
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"Absent an explicit waiver, the power of the local legis-
lature is limited to taking such action as is necessary 
to bridge a single budget period." 
The thrust of the Mount Vernon decision was that the legislative 
body could not impose terms and conditions of employment beyond a one year 
period, in that case, the fiscal year. In the instant case, as opposed to 
Mount Vernon, the fiscal year and the contract year were not synchronized. 
We feel that the principle of the Mount Vernon decision should be applied 
but adjusted to recognize the difference between the fiscal and contract 
year but nevertheless limiting the imposition of terms and conditions 
of employment by the legislature to one year. Moreover, the concern that 
we expressed in the Mount Vernon case about the relationship of the contract 
period to the budgetmaking process of a public employer is not compelling 
here, inasmuch as the parties have previously agreed to a contract that was 
not coterminous with the employer's fiscal year. 
Respondent's arguments are even less persuasive. It proposes that 
its legislative determination be applied so as to excuse it from negotiating 
for a period of eighteen months. The hearing officer correctly reasons that 
this is "a longer period of time than any emergency is claimed to exist (see 
Mount Vernon, supra)." 
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer's determination that, 
although respondent was not obligated to negotiate with the charging party 
for a new agreement to take effect on January 1, 1976, it was obligated to 
negotiate with the charging party over a new agreement to take effect on July 
1, 1976=and that it refused to do so. This refusal was a violation of 
Civil Service Law §209-a.l(d). 
Board - U-2149 -4 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER respondent to negotiate in good faith 
with the charging party. 
Dated: New York, New York 
April 7, 1977. 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, Chairman 
7 (UM OSEBS R. CROWLEY 7 U-
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In the Matter of the 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTH SYRACUSE 
CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
Case No. D-0142 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
On December 3, 1976, Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that the Education Association of the Nortt 
Syracuse Central School District, had violated Civil Service Law 
§210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned and 
engaged in an 8 day strike against, the North Syracuse Central 
School District on November 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10, 1976, 
The Education Association of the North Syracuse Central School 
District filed an answer but thereafter agreed to withdraw it, thus 
admitting all of the allegations of the charge,, The Charging Partj 
recommends a spenalty- of. "-rlossvof dues-check-off privileges for 607o 
of its annual dues, — which the Association accepts. 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we determine that the 
recommended penalty is a reasonable one. 
We find that the Education Association of the North Syracuse 
Central School District violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in 
a strike as charged. 
WE ORDER that the dues deduction privileges of the 
Education Association of the North Syracuse 
- This is intended to be the equivalent of seven months suspension 
if dues were deducted in equal monthly installments throughout 
the year. In fact, the annual dues of the Education Association 
of the North Syracuse Central School District are not deducted 
in this manner, fiP'^Ci 
Central School District be suspended, 
commencing on the first practicable date, 
so that no further dues be deducted by 
the North Syracuse Central School District 
on its behalf for a period of time during 
which 60% of its annual dues would other-
wise be deducted. Thereafter, no dues 
shall be deducted on its behalf by the North 
Syracuse Central School District until the 
Education Association of the North Syracuse 
Central School District affirms that it no 
longer asserts the right to strike against 
any government as required by the provisions 
of CSL §201.3(g). 
Dated: New :York, - N. Y>. • 
April 7, 1977 
,--yJM 
JOSEPHS R. CROWLEY \ 
IDA KLAUS 
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